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A few months ago, Samuel Moyn delivered the 2020 Page-Barbour Lecture series 
at the University of Virginia, under the title "A History of Duties for an Age of Rights." 
Little more than one year before, Moyn wrote (arguably) his most important book so 
far on the history of human rights, which we are presently reviewing.  
The author of this interesting book is a Professor of Law and History at Yale 
University. He has produced for us already some intriguing work with a marked 
historical and political character – and his The Last Utopia (2012) provides us with a 
fine show display of his craftsmanship in putting historical narrative to work for the 
demonstration of political points. In fact, and in particular, it seems that an 
important characteristic of his historical works is their level of achievement in 
integrating a unique approach to human rights with the historical context of those 
rights. Moyn draws upon ideas of diverse disciplinary provenance, from philosophy, 
history, law, and sociology, giving his ideas a currency and relevance in his specific 
field, as well as managing to capture plenty of interest elsewhere.  
The book of our present attention, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal 
World, is a largely historical examination of "sufficiency" and "equality" as they have 
come to relate to the distribution of goods in contemporary society. Ensuring that 
the otherwise penurious have sufficient material welfare is an agenda that has come 
to be strongly associated with human rights.  This association has cemented to that 
point that human rights language is the language one would use when championing 
the alleviation of the abject and the destitute. Befittingly so; yet what may escape 
our notice is the failure of sufficiency-minded alleviation to level out the (growing) 
social and economic hierarchies that sit on top of the (growing) demographic of the 
non-destitute.  
As Moyn asserts in the beginning of the book: "Enough, in this view, is not 
enough" (p. 4). Indeed, what may also escape our notice, he tells us, is that "Human 
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rights do not necessarily call for a modicum of distributive equality" (p. 3), so that we 
are left to infer that neither alleviation of the destitute nor, more crucially for Moyn, 
the language and notions of human rights are sufficient for equality. 
At least, this is what we would infer from a rigorously argued history 
demonstrating the proposed relationship between equality, sufficiency, and human 
rights – including, as one might come to expect, a good and persuasive account of 
how human rights got tangled up with sufficiency in precisely this way. Just this is 
what Moyn looks to provide, and it constitutes most of the book’s anatomy. "The 
primary goal of what follows", he says, "is to chart the evolution of human rights to 
illustrate how (…) they reached this state of imprisonment" (p. 6).  
Among the contemporary jail wardens responsible for the imprisonment of 
human rights language are the articulate defenders of "market fundamentalism" and 
"neoliberalism" (p. 8), among which are to be counted politicians and philosophers – 
especially modern philosophers of human rights (p. 9). But the story apparently 
stretches a bit further back than the current trends among philosophers. 
We are first given a story that goes from the Old Testament through the French 
Revolution. A concern for sufficiency, we are told, has a history beginning as early as 
various monotheistic injunctions demanding concern for the poor’s indigence (p. 16). 
Yet it was through the legacy left by the "the first welfare state", (p. 22) in particular 
the "Jacobin national welfare state", that equality among citizens, over and above 
mere sufficiency, was first demanded (p. 23). This ideal would fall into disuse, as 
signaled by Thomas Paine’s rejection of distributive equality in his book on agrarian 
justice (pp. 24-25). 
Next, the ambitious historical survey brings us swiftly to the eve of the 20th 
century – when the early embers of socialism began to kindle (p. 25) – and then to 
key events of the following century, especially in the post-war period. Among such 
events we find: the rise of national socialism, the emergence of national welfare, e.g. 
in Roosevelt’s New Deal, decolonization, and the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Concerning the UDHR, Moyn suggests that it should be read as 
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orbiting around "the project of national welfare", whereas it is presently read as "an 
internationalization of rights politics that occurred decades later [than the 
document’s writing]" (p. 44).   
Over the time elapsed since the (unsuccessful, anyway) Jacobin state, an 
increasingly wide margin of social and economic disparity grew. While this trend of 
disparity began then perhaps in the late 18th century, and continued through the 
immediate post-war period, the breaking point was the Cold War (1947-91), when 
the human rights revolution "occurred almost ex nihilo" (p. 121). This manifested 
itself in different ways on various continents, but in the end, the winners were the 
capitalists who asserted themselves through their global campaign of 
"neoliberalism", a "maelstrom" leaving in its wake a global eruption of social and 
economic inequality. "What was really occurring", Moyn says, "was the detachment 
of social rights from the welfare state project that had birthed them" (p. 193). 
The entrapment of human rights in neoliberalism has left us in a world of mere 
sufficiency, a world at odds with economic equality. This is the world of Croesus, "a 
kind of utopia" (p. 212) wherein the "wonderfully rich" Croesus bestows, in his 
magnanimity, sufficient provision for those well below him.  
Moyn’s narrative leaves us with a bleak, but not despairing picture: "[A dream of 
welfare] will not look like our human rights movement, which has become 
prominent as our world has become more like Croesus’s. (…) Human rights will 
return to their defensible importance only as soon as humanity saves itself from its 
low ambitions. If it does, for the sake of local and global welfare, sufficiency and 
equality can again become powerful companions, both in moral lives and in our 
political enterprises" (p. 220).  
While the book as a whole is interesting, we may ponder how profound a 
renovation or innovation is really needed to secure a "dream of welfare." If we are 
supposed to radically reframe our outlook as one between "barbarism" and 
"socialism" (p. 220) in the interest of equality, the required conversion from one to 
the other may require a profundity such that today’s advocates of socialism would 
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be tomorrow’s enemies of equality – and not just in the banal way that Kant and 
Rousseau could, as mere predecessors, be enemies of Rawls. Distributive equality 
may come to mean something more and different than material equality, in which 
case a story which treats the concept as, here at least, functionally the same (quasi-
theological?) from Deuteronomy to the UDHR would need to be rewritten.  
If the dream of welfare has never been successfully fully thought or worked 
through, one might wonder whether there is not something important hidden from 
our sight. In particular, if the plot is supposed to twist as we discover that mere 
sufficiency is too thin compared with the ideal of equality, it may twist again if we 
find that mere welfare is too thin compared to some grander and less barbaric 
notion of human flourishing. 
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